

The Vienna Circle and the Consolidation of Scientific Superiority over Metaphysics

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Abstract

This paper unravels the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of a Western-backed approach as a demonstration of a form of epistemic continence. It looks towards a Meta-Epistemic consolidation that will ensure unity between metaphysics and epistemology (science) without valorizing any. The suggestions and arguments in this work hinge on three posits: First, the advent of Modern Empiricism on the one hand, and the development Objectivist Epistemology on the other hand, played significant roles in shaping the ideas of the Vienna Circle. It further argues that the Circle took for granted that knowledge founded only on empirical evidence may sound attractive, yet remains partial. Last, the paper asserts that the consolidation of scientific superiority rather acts as a fetter against the production and dissemination of holistic knowledge constructs. Consequently, considering the complex nature of the scientific practice, the work suggests the need to reintegrate other approaches to knowledge in research, as well as reconstruct knowledge systems to accommodate diversity. In this regard, contrary to some claims, when knowledge pursuit proceeds by the elimination of meta-theories as well as other forms of knowledge, it runs the risk of falling into a reductionist conception of knowledge.

Keywords: Epistemology, Logical positivism, Metaphysics, Scientific knowledge, Vienna Circle

Introduction

The quest to establish the affinity between science and metaphysics constitutes one of the major philosophical enquiries in the history of thought. The relationship between the two is viewed differently by different pundits across the history of ideas. This paper sets out to restate the question regarding the preeminence of science over metaphysics. It unravels the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of a Western-backed approach as a demonstration of a form of epistemic continence. It looks towards a *Meta-Epistemic* consolidation that will ensure unity between metaphysics and epistemology (science). Thinkers such as Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, John Locke and David Hume are emphatic on scientific superiority over metaphysics, whereas, Rene Descartes, Leibniz and Carol Rovane think that metaphysics forms the basis of scientific knowledge. Members of the Vienna Circle thus sought to construct a Philosophy of Science that will abrogate this age-old problem. To them, the elimination of metaphysics from science was indispensable. It is important to state that this approach to epistemic research negates hitherto medieval and Cartesian claims according to which knowledge hinges on divine sources and as a tree whose base is metaphysics, the trunk physics and

the branches being other sciences respectively (Descartes, 1644: 6). The Vienna Circle comprised of a group of 20th-century philosophers whose preoccupation was the reconceptualization and investigation of scientific, logical, linguistic and mathematical problems. Founded in Vienna by Moritz Schlick, who, himself was inspired by Bertrand Russell's defence of empiricism based on the new logic (Wittgenstein, 2003: XVIII). Other members include Rudolf Carnap, Hahn Hans, Frank Phillip, A.J. Ayer and Ludwig Wittgenstein. With the ambition to make philosophy scientific and establishing a scientific conception of the world, these scholars sought to eliminate knowledge constructs whose scientific basis could not be proven. In this light, "all metaphysics should be replaced by the new discipline of epistemology or theory of knowledge so that philosophy itself would now become scientific" (Creath, 2012: 1). Richard Creath concurs when he argues that, "the fundamental problem, which that time placed at the beginning of all science, was that of the theory of knowledge: what is truth in our intuition and thought? In what sense do our representations correspond to actuality? Philosophy and natural science encounter this problem from two opposing sides; it is a common task of both (p.2).

The term Science has its origin in the Greek word *episteme* and from the Latin *Scientia* which means knowledge. Science is a method of discovering reliable knowledge of nature (Schafersman, 1997). From the conceptual and reflective perspective, science could be seen as a body of knowledge that is acquired through rigorous and demonstrated approaches given attaining a universal value. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is a derivative of *meta* and *phusika*, translated as "beyond" and "nature" respectively. It is that branch of philosophy which focuses on the essence of being. That is a reality beyond the scope of nature. To Aristotle, it is the study of the foundation of essences, of the new foundation of knowledge (Rene Descartes), of the foundation of criticism (Immanuel Kant) and the foundation of meanings (Phenomenologists). According to Carol Rovane, "Metaphysics" is any inquiry into the most general aspects of what there is, or how things are, or the nature of the things that are" (Rovane, 2013: 4). Metaphysics consists in the systematic study of the most fundamental logical and modal properties of things (1987: 77). With this understanding, this paper argues that, the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of Western-backed approach suggests a form of epistemic continence. The suggestions and arguments in this work hinge on three hypotheses: First, the advent of Modern Empiricism and the development Objectivist Epistemology played significant roles in shaping the ideas of the Circle. Second, the Circle took for granted that knowledge founded only on empirical evidence may sound attractive, yet remains partial. Finally, that the consolidation of scientific superiority rather acts as a fetter against the production and dissemination of holistic knowledge constructs. In consonance with the aforementioned hypotheses, one is driven to reiterate a Meta-epistemic approach to pluralistic knowledge.

Modern Empiricism and the Rise of Scientific Knowledge

The historical context of the emergence of the Vienna Circle could be traced right back to modern Empiricism. Modern empiricists like Francis Bacon, Roger Bacon, Locke and Hume played an antecedent role in the emergence of the Vienna Circle in the

twentieth century. The common objective is to develop a science void of dogmatism, by proposing more authentic and logically sound approaches to scientific knowledge. Recurrent amongst the approaches are experimentation, verification and observation. Bacon, a major proponent of modern Empiricism is noted for his defence of observable approaches to knowledge. To him, it is impossible to access reality behind the sensations with which one is impressed (H. Irving. 2008: 6). Roger Bacon on his part hints that: “observation and experience constitute the door to knowledge and the criterion of truth” (Stella, 2008: 61). Here, a paradigmatic shift from the traditional approach to knowledge of the ancient and medieval thinkers is highlighted. This traditional approach gave credence to metaphysics as the foundation of knowledge. To Bacon, genuine knowledge is based on the collection of facts or sense data. Here, two distinct steps are involved: the collection of facts and involving the classification of facts collected, thereby deducing from the new data. These two steps depend on observations and experimentations which are the model of the new and successful mode for the advancement of learning (H. Irving. 2008: 7). With this approach, Bacon singles out himself as an advocate of the Aristotelian legacy of empiricism. Experience to him, is the source of human knowledge, with induction as the only acceptable method of acquiring reliable and practical knowledge. He posits:

Now my method, though hard to practice, is easy to explain; and it is this. I propose to establish progressive stages of certainty. The evidence of the sense helped and guarded by a certain process of correction, I retain. But the mental operation which follows the act of sense I, for the most part, reject; and instead of it I open and lay out a new and certain path for the mind to proceed in, starting directly from the simple sensuous perception (p. 10).

This Baconian position developed an empirical scientific system characterized by Observation, experimentation, and Explanation. Inspired by this approach, Carnap contends regarding the scientific procedure:

The activities of a scientist are in part practical given that he arranges experiments and makes observations. Another aspect is theoretical because he formulates the results of his observations in sentences, compares the results with those of other observers, tries to explain them by a theory, and endeavors to confirm a theory proposed by himself or somebody else (Carnap, 1939: 1).

Apart from Bacon, Locke is another pertinent modern empiricist whose thought the Vienna Circle is predicated. His epistemology as an antithesis to the Rationalists' doctrine of innatism asserts that innate ideas rather act as fetters to knowledge acquisition. He thus emphasized the indispensable role of observation and experience in the process of knowledge acquisition (Locke, 1828: 51). All ideas to him, therefore, come from experience which could either be the experience of sensation or reflection (p. 51). In this phrase, Locke expresses his conception of the mind as a *tabula rasa*. The original state of the mind at birth, to Locke, is void of preexisting ideas. This is a claim that A.J. Ayer ratifies when he asserts that, “the view of philosophy which we have adopted may, I think, fairly be described as a form of empiricism it is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew metaphysics, on the ground that every factual proposition must refer to sense-experience” (Ayer, 1935: 37). Locke's stance concerning experience, ties to Bertrand Russell

according to whom “in the search for certainty, it is natural, to begin with, our present experiences, and in some sense; no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them” (Russell, 1912: 4). Concurring with Russell, Berkeley states that:

It is evident to anyone who takes a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colors with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for example, Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Resistance, and of all these more and less either as to Quantity or Degree. Smelling furnishes me with Odors; the Palate with Tastes and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Composition (Berkeley, 2002:12).

This conception of experience as the only reliable foundation of scientific knowledge developed by modern empiricist thinkers like Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon, Locke, Hume and Berkeley, became a prelude to the foundation of the Vienna Circle.

The Influence of Objectivist Epistemology and German Idealism on the Vienna Circle

The controversy between German Idealism from Immanuel Kant to Hegel and the objectivist epistemology of Bernard Bolzano is noted to have revolved around the question of reliable human knowledge (Stadler, 2001: XV). Earlier objectivist epistemologists, on the one hand, claimed that knowledge or reality is attained independent of the human mind. Idealists on the other hand opine that thoughts are the fundamental reality. Kant, faithful to the idealist culture, is emphatic that: though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions (Kant, 2003: 30). He emphasizes on the existence of *Apriori* and *a posteriori* forms of knowledge regarded as a form of epistemological metaphysics.

In *the Critique of Pure Reason (1781)*, Kant inquires into the *apriori* forms of sensation, judgment, and reasoning. Even though considered by Locke as knowledge, Kant sets out to distinguish between the material, or content, and the form, of sensation. The material of sense-knowledge comes from experience. The form, however, is not derived through the senses, rather, it is imposed on the material, or content by the mind, to render the material or content universal and necessary. Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience. These cognitions employ conceptions whose corresponding objects cannot be captured by our experience. (p. 30). He grounded his theory of knowledge in the following lines: thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind (Stern, 2015: 55), suggesting that knowledge is the combination of thought and intuitions. By emphasizing the distinction between the necessary knowledge that is *a priori* and experiential knowledge that is contingent and *a posteriori*, Kant's critical philosophy attempts to demonstrate the nature and limits of human knowledge. Further, he considers the reconciliation of the two opposing tendencies on the origin of knowledge which involves reason and experience. This

distinction, he maintains, is further understood as the one which exists between analytical and synthetic judgments.

Bernard Bolzano for his part thinks that knowledge can be attained through experience and speculation (Bolzano, 1950). It is in this vein that Christoph Limbeck Lilieneau will affirm: “many philosophical traditions have been mentioned as predecessors of logical empiricism that led to the emergence of the Vienna Circle, from Ernst Mach's empiricism and Bertrand Russell's new logic to Neo-Kantianism and Austrian philosophy in the tradition of Bolzano and Brentano” (Lilieneau, 2019). Bolzano emphasizes the view that knowledge is acquired through recollection and experiences. For these reasons, the author denounces the distinction between knowledge and cognition. Members of the Vienna Circle taken aback by this approach to knowledge construction will work towards the elimination of metaphysics from the field of objective knowledge.

The Vienna Circle and the Preeminence of Science as Opposed to Metaphysics

Discussions and deliberations of the Vienna circle centered around the questions of scientific knowledge and metaphysics. They sought to establish the superiority of scientific knowledge over Metaphysics. As Russell puts it, to better understand a philosophical theory, it is necessary to attempt an appreciation of its force of argument (Russell, 1912: VII). It thus becomes incumbent on one to analyze and reexamine the hitherto claims of scientific supremacy over meta-theories. We thus, opt to do this taking in to account their defense of experience and/ or perception as the foundation of human knowledge void of any Metaphysical consideration.

The mission of the Vienna Circle was to develop an epistemology of exact sciences based on facts and empirical evidence. Moritz Schlick noted that the Circle ascribed a particular value to science and a special and distinct epistemological status to scientific knowledge since science is the search for knowledge *par excellence*. As such, to them, scientific knowledge is the only real knowledge. What validates this claim, to him is that the progress science makes. This attempt to demonstrate the superiority of scientific knowledge is not akin only to the 20th century. It dates as far as the modern period. This is evoked by Nyuykongi 2020:

It is not uncommon to have philosophers of science drum the virtues of modern science, sing its glories and claim that there is no other source of knowledge that is capable of satisfying man's quest for certitude other than Science. These claims, they say, are corroborated by the fact that modern science is capable of attaining objective truth while others are not. Here, the rational nature of science is emphasized as a virtue over the irrational nature of nonscientific sources of knowledge (Nyuykongi, 2020: 470).

Prior to this, Schlick had announced that there is no other way of understanding the world but a scientific one (Schlick, 1979: 132). Reasoning from the position of the Vienna Participants such as Carnap, the scientific conception of the world is familiar only with empirical statements about things of all kinds and analytic statements of logic and mathematics (Carnap, 1973: 298). The Viennese saw metaphysics as the worst enemy of science and the only way to understand the world is by science. To them, Metaphysics is not a valid form of knowledge since it deals with the supernatural, barren of any solid

terrestrial foundation. The verification principle became the yardstick used to determine whether or not, a knowledge construct is scientific as opposed to metaphysics. To know, following Ayer, is to have experience with something that could empirically be verified (Ayer, 1956: 2-3). This was antithetical to the Cartesians for whom; “*I Think*” is the precursor to knowledge acquisition. Otto Neurath, for instance, is known for his anti-foundational approach to epistemic and metaphysical questions, specifically, his rejection of *aprioristic* reasoning. He denounces mysticisms, metaphysics as well as theological beliefs which to him, are epistemic traps. To buttress this, Jan Sebestik emphasized Neurath's epistemology in his physicalism. To him:

Physicalism is the positive side of a doctrine whose negative side is expressed by the slogan *elimination of metaphysics*. Two major reasons guided the Viennese in their opposition to metaphysics: its historical and social role and the absence of cognitive content. In the first place, Neurath fights metaphysics under the banner of Enlightenment. Heir of theology, and metaphysics was on the side of obscurantist and oppressive forces. Cognitive reasons are equally compelling. The parallel and complementary doctrines of Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, and Hahn, but also of the poet Paul Valéry coincide in this point: metaphysical statements are meaningless; they are but pseudo-statements, sequences of words that do not designate anything and do not mean anything. It is impossible to connect them with an object, an observation, a phenomenon or an act. They can have an emotional and perhaps a poetical effect, but no cognitive value (Sebestik, 2011: 41).

The author substituted an *apriori* form of reasoning for an *aposteriori* one. This substitution had one main objective; the elimination of metaphysical claims of knowledge and its introspective methods. The knowledge that conforms to scientific methods of observation, experimentation and verification, thus, was bound to undergo purification from metaphysical and religious dogmas in conjunction with their meaningless statements. Some of such statements, they claim, are the doctrine of innate ideas defended by Plato in ancient times and Descartes in the modern era (Jumbam and Kernyuy, 2022: 495-507).

According to A.J. Ayer, for example, the quest for objective knowledge must not accommodate the rationalists' and idealists' approaches. This suggests the barren nature of meta-scientific approaches to knowledge. Real scientific knowledge, to him, should not go beyond the limits of sense experience. Therefore, any knowledge construct which attempts to go beyond the limits of possible sense experience, became fruitless and sterile. Every knowledge or statement of knowledge must be gotten in conformity with the *criterion* of verifiability. Vienna Circle philosophers generally argued on the falsity of the doctrine of metaphysics because it opposes empirical knowledge and is thus unverifiable.

Considering empirical evidence and logically sound arguments as the only basis towards the acquisition of genuine knowledge, members of the Vienna Circle developed an anti-metaphysical attitude which could be summarised in four essential points as follows: (1) a distinct epistemological status; (2) conceptual and Linguistic clarity; (3) accorded value to scientific knowledge attained through empirical evidence and logical sound statements; and (4) the notion of inter-subjectivity and the quest for genuine knowledge. Their distinct epistemological status is emphasized by their zeal to

demonstrate the supremacy of science thereby paving the way for a deeper appreciation of scientific knowledge as opposed to other forms of knowledge. One major characteristic of science employed as a challenge to other sources of knowledge is that science, with its unique approach, produces a result and its alternatives do not. These results, the scientists claim, are tagged to its method and its universality.

Second, the Circle focused on the notion of conceptual and linguistic clarity. Ludwig Wittgenstein for instance, credits the sound nature of logical statements on the logically perfect language. He hereby separates the epistemological problem of language from the psychological problem of knowledge. He further signals a challenge to know, what the nature of the relation subsisting between thoughts, words or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean is: this problem, to him, belongs to epistemology (Wittgenstein, 2015: 4-5). He thinks that a reliable theory of scientific knowledge solely depends on the logical structure of propositions and their language meanings. This symbolic language helps us to separate the theory of knowledge from mystical, theological and metaphysical biases. It is the logically perfect language that prevents us from falling into the nonsensical statements of metaphysics. Finally, it is important to note that the Circle thus, accorded utmost value to scientific knowledge attained through empirical evidence and logically sound statements against the notion of inter-subjectivity and the quest for genuine knowledge. This notion of inter-subjectivity, it must be mentioned, goes beyond the pure subjectivist epistemology of Descartes.

The Way Forward: Towards a Meta-Epistemic Approach to Pluralistic Knowledge

In this sub part, one argues that the Circle's consolidation of the superiority of epistemology over metaphysics leads inevitably to a reductionist conception of knowledge. One concurs with Kant who suggests that knowledge results from the fusion of thought and intuitions. Kant emphasized the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* forms of knowledge. He further attempted to reconcile the two opposing tendencies on the origin of knowledge vis, reason and experience. This distinction is understood as the one which exists between analytical and synthetic judgments. Bernard Bolzano on his part thinks that knowledge can be attained through experience and speculation (Bolzano, 1950). On the other hand, the Circle's bias towards the superiority of the sciences and the elimination of metaphysical voices is a barrier to growth and research in science and epistemology. In fact:

When epistemology is defined as an inquiry, it suggests that epistemology is an inquiry into the possibility, scope and limits of knowledge. This presupposes that knowledge claims are shrouded with possibilities and impossibilities, a characteristic feature which calls for complementarity of approaches, not competition ... current epistemologies are fundamentally biased and this trend is detrimental to global epistemic ... From thence, one argues further that there is the possibility of a bias-free epistemology, which is achievable when strides are made towards complementing epistemic approaches rather than raising competing voices (Nyuykongi, 2020: 14).

The suggestion here is that, epistemology should not claim complete autonomy from nor claim superiority over neighboring notions like metaphysics, beliefs and opinions. This position equally agrees with Feyerabend, especially on the need to take into account

existing alternative approaches to knowledge acquisition. To Feyerabend, for instance, scientific autocracy should be substituted by methodological pluralism. This, to him, will ensure progress in knowledge acquisition. He criticised the implementation of fixed rules in scientific practice by noting as follows:

You can be a good empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many alternative theories rather than with a single point of view and experience. This plurality of theories must not be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will in the future be replaced by the One True Theory. Theoretical pluralism is assumed to be an essential feature of all knowledge that claims to be objective. Such a plurality allows for a much sharper criticism of accepted ideas than does the comparison with a domain of facts which are supposed to sit there independently of theoretical considerations (p. 8).

Methodological anarchism, to Feyerabend, is a precondition of progress in science, that “there is only *one* principle that can be defended under *all* circumstances and in *all* stages of human development. It is the principle *anything goes*.” (Bruce, 1994: 83). To buttress his point, Feyerabend argues elsewhere that:

A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the view he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can therefore introduces other views; that is, he must adopt a pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas with other ideas rather than with 'experience' and he must try to improve rather than discard the views that have failed in the competition (Feyerabend, 1993: 21).

This defence of plurality of approaches in the quest for epistemic certitude only goes a long way to strengthen the argument that the rejection of metaphysics rather acts as a fetter to epistemic growth. Growth in knowledge is predicated on the complementarity of approaches with the positivist approach. Epistemic bias in favour of science backed theories and against non-scientific theories obstructs growth in knowledge. This is because, on a closer look, one notices some sort of mutuality between the alternative approaches to knowledge. For this reason, Feyerabend's defence of methodological anarchism as a precondition to scientific progress set out to liberate science research from falling in to the pit of dogmatism, especially the dogmatism of the rationalists and the empiricists. To attain objective knowledge, there is the need to ensure that one principle is defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. Feyerabend adumbrated this claim in *Science in a Free Society*, 1978. Elsewhere, Feyerabend, in defense of pluralistic approach to science research, speaks of the limitations inherent in all methodologies, scientific methodologies inclusive. He maintains:

All methodologies have their limits; the development of science combines reason and practice (he ultimately labels this interactionist view, in which methodology serves as a guide who is part of the activity guided and is changed by it); rationalism is only one tradition among many, so should not be used to judge other traditions; a plurality of traditions is not only reasonable, it is useful, and it is correct (Bruce, 1994: 84-85).

The prestige attributed to science is once more punctured in this paper when the author interrogates; what is great about science. A careful examination of scientific activities reveals a squalid picture of irrationality and trial and error and not rationality, objectivity and operational status. Robert Mackie concurs when he reiterates that:

Central to Feyerabend's concern has been the divorce between theories of scientific activity and the

actual practices of science. Attempts by philosophers of science to account for the growth of knowledge have been seriously flawed by what he sees as the limits of rationality and the desire to make Great Science conform to Great Standards. Indeed, Feyerabend has a derisively scornful attitude towards the efforts of philosophers of science, apart from himself of course. Bastard subjects such as the philosophy of science, which have not a single discovery to their credit, profit from the boom of the sciences and should be allowed to die a natural death (Mackie, 1983: 48).

The much-cherished principle of Anything Goes was at the centre of his liberalism. He gave credence to what a rationalist will term untenable theories. This, through what he called anarchism. However, he insisted that epistemology should become anarchic, or that philosophy of science should become anarchic. To him, both disciplines should receive anarchism as medicine. This is because, epistemology is sick, and it must be cured. The best medication being anarchy (Feyerabend, 1978: 127).

Without playing the advocate for epistemological anarchism *a la Feyerabend*, I suggest the urgent need for research in science to go beyond the scientific optimism of the Vienna Circle, the need to tailor our research toward a more inclusive metaphysical perspective. It is worth stating here that, the traditional role of metaphysics was to provide a synthesis for the different specialisms within knowledge, it is not then outdated. This role still suffices. As if to concur, Aleksandr Kulieshov's argument is pertinent. To him, any knowledge or understanding of reality is found within the horizon of a certain world picture (Kulieshov, 2017). That is why a metaphysical perspective is inevitable for any cognitive activity of human beings. Such a perspective can have rational, irrational or supra-rational representations. Rational representation is known under the name of metaphysics as a branch of theoretical knowledge. The two main sources of this knowledge are experience and speculative thinking (or *Apriori* reasoning). The latter is also derived from experience but undergoes a crucial break up with it using abstraction. Empirical knowledge and to a great extent speculative knowledge are represented within the sphere of theoretical cognition by natural and social sciences. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is essentially connected with Metaphysics. The implication of this conclusion thus puts to question the position held by the Vienna thinkers.

Conclusion

The major concern in this paper was to examine the pertinence of the Vienna Circle's quest for the consolidation of scientific superiority over other forms of knowledge such as Metaphysics and Theology. In an attempt to resolve this preoccupation, we began by tracing the general context of the emergence of their thoughts. The historical context of the emergence of the Vienna Circle could be traced right back to Modern Empiricism, Comtean Positivism, Logical Positivism or Empiricism, German Idealism and Objectivist Epistemology. These schools of thought greatly influenced the founding of the Vienna Circle. A global and strict analysis of the thoughts of the Vienna circle conceptions of the scientific supremacy over meta-theories through their defence of experience and/ or perception as the foundation of human knowledge independent of the metaphysical foundation has also been considered. The Vienna Circle philosophers who were mostly scientists, physicists, mathematicians and logicians, established a distinct epistemological status based on the model of exact sciences. To achieve this, they laid

emphasis on the supremacy of science. Such an approach to knowledge pushed many thinkers to carry out a deeper appreciation of scientific knowledge as opposed to other forms of knowledge whose approach parallels that of the exact science. This work equally problematized the pertinence of their thoughts, highlighting, as a matter of necessity, the pertinence of a pluralist approach to knowledge pursuits. In fact, sustaining scientific superiority over Meta-theories, the Vienna Circle introduced a fetter against the production and dissemination of holistic knowledge constructs. In this vein, this paper thus reiterates the need for a Meta-epistemic approach to pluralistic knowledge. Here, it suggests the integration of diverse approaches to knowledge which spans beyond the scientific optimism of the Vienna Circle and her reductionist drive to knowledge. This is because, epistemic advancement and progress in science is not better archived by the rejection of alternative voices and theories. Rather, growth in knowledge is directly proportional to one's capacity to accommodate and complement the other.

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