The Vienna Circle and the Consolidation of Scientific Superiority over Metaphysics

  • Nyuykongi John Paul (Ph.D)
Keywords: Epistemology, Logical positivism, Metaphysics, Scientific knowledge, Vienna Circle


This paper unravels the Vienna Circle's attempt to adjudicate the question of veritable knowledge in favour of a Western-backed approach as a demonstration of a form of epistemic continence. It looks towards a Meta-Epistemic consolidation that will ensure unity between metaphysics and epistemology (science) without valorizing any. The suggestions and arguments in this work hinge on three posits: First, the advent of Modern Empiricism on the one hand, and the development Objectivist Epistemology on the other hand, played significant roles in shaping the ideas of the Vienna Circle. It further argues that the Circle took for granted that knowledge founded only on empirical evidence may sound attractive, yet remains partial. Last, the paper asserts that the consolidation of scientific superiority rather acts as a fetter against the production and dissemination of holistic knowledge constructs. Consequently, considering the complex nature of the scientific practice, the work suggests the need to reintegrate other approaches to knowledge in research, as well as reconstruct knowledge systems to accommodate diversity. In this regard, contrary to some claims, when knowledge pursuit proceeds by the elimination of meta-theories as well as other forms of knowledge, it runs the risk of falling into a reductionist conception of knowledge.