A CRITIQUE OF QUINE’S NATURALISING EPISTE- MOLOGY

Resumen

The aim of the present paper is to evaluate Quine’s idea of naturalising epistemology, which was an attempt to annex epistemology to psychology. Herein, I offer a critical analysis of Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalised,” a project to bring epistemology under the purview of natural science; by doing so, naturalised epistemology is to replace the normative preoccupations of traditional epistemology with a descriptive account of knowledge acquisition. Quine’s explanation of knowledge derivation is premised on the relationship between the mind’s vast theoretical output and the meagre empirical inputs of our sensory experience. I examine the argument of Quine and the objections to his argument and conclude that his project to naturalize epistemology failed because it could not satisfactorily account for the problem of circularity and normativity.